Language learners learn the meanings of many thousands of words, despite encountering them in complex environments where infinitely many meanings might be inferred by the learner as their true meaning. This problem of infinite referential uncertainty is often attributed to Willard Van Orman Quine. We provide a mathematical formalisation of an ideal cross-situational learner attempting to learn under infinite referential uncertainty, and identify conditions under which this can happen. As Quine's intuitions suggest, learning under infinite uncertainty is possible, provided that learners have some means of ranking candidate word meanings in terms of their plausibility; furthermore, our analysis shows that this ranking could in fact be exceedingly weak, implying that constraints allowing learners to infer the plausibility of candidate word meanings could also be weak.
I. INTRODUCTION
Children are prolific word learners, learning around 60,000 words by age 18 [1] . Such prodigious word-learning abilities are even more remarkable when we consider some of the challenges facing the word learner, including the need to segment words from connected speech [2] , to generalise word forms across speakers [3] , and to identify the syntactic properties of those words [4] . In this paper we focus on another aspect of the word learning problem: inferring word meaning. Children will typically encounter words in a complex environment. How do they know what these words mean? Every time a word is used, there may be many meanings which a learner could infer as the word's true meaning: the learner will face referential uncertainty. As discussed below, a widespread observation in the literature is that there are potentially infinitely many candidate meanings which would be consistent with any given situation of usage. This idea, which we will refer to as infinite referential uncertainty, is commonly assumed to make word learning impossible, and is usually attributed to Quine [5] , although we think his central point was rather different.
Regardless of its provenance, the infinite referential uncertainty hypothesis has been crucial in the development of two approaches to word learning, which differ in emphasis but are entirely compatible in content. One position emphasises the importance of heuristics which guide word learning, serving to reduce referential uncertainty and allow the learner to make accurate inferences about word meaning. These heuristics might include exploiting the attentional focus of a speaker [6] ; assuming that words refer to whole objects [7] ; and constraining hypotheses about the meaning of new words by using knowledge of argument structure and syntactic context [8] , or the meaning of other words, e.g. by assuming that word meanings are mutually exclusive [9] . Heuristic-driven accounts emphasise how such constraints enable learners to eliminate uncertainty about word meaning and form good hypotheses about word meaning on even a single exposure to a word.
In the strongest accounts, these heuristics are hypothesised to eliminate all uncertainty. However, the possibility that learners may be confronted with some residual referential uncertainty even after the heuristics have done their work has driven a recent burst of interest in a second approach to word learning, emphasising integration of information across multiple exposures to learn in the face of referential uncertainty. Cross-situational learning comes in various flavours, from the classic formulation [10] to associationist treatments [11] and more minimal accounts [12, 13] . In its most powerful instantiation (e.g. [10] ), cross-situational learning involves tracking the set of meanings which has been consistently inferred on every exposure to some target word: the word's true meaning should be a member of this set, which can be winnowed down across a series of exposures until it includes only the true meaning. Cross-situational learning accounts typically assume the presence of heuristics which serve to reduce referential uncertainty to manageable levels: rather than replacing heuristics, their contribution is to explore the extent to which word learning is possible even given some residual (i.e. non-zero, but typically small) referential uncertainty.
Exploring the interaction between heuristic and cross-situational approaches, we previously [14] applied mathematical techniques to quantify what residual level of referential uncertainty a crosssituational learner can tolerate while still learning a large lexicon in a reasonable timeframe. This work focussed on calculating learning times for lexicons given finite meaning spaces and finite levels of referential uncertainty. In this paper we apply similar techniques to tackle the problem of crosssituational learning for infinite meaning spaces under infinite referential uncertainty. In doing so, we seek to address what is often (perhaps rather loosely) called "Quine's Problem" or "the gavagai problem", the notion that word learning under infinite referential uncertainty is impossible. We show, however, that word learning under such conditions is in principle possible, provided that learners have heuristics which at least rank the plausibility of each candidate meaning at every exposure. Thus, as in fact envisaged by Quine, word learning is possible if learners know, of the infinitely many possible meanings a word could have on any given situation of usage, that some are more plausible than others. Within this very general set of conditions, given enough time, cross-situational learning can be used to eliminate uncertainty. Furthermore, cross-situational learning will be possible even if the learner's heuristics only impose very weak constraints on the plausibility ranking. This therefore suggests similar conclusions to our previous work exploring finite uncertainty: word learning heuristics can in principle be far weaker than previously suggested and still allow word learning. Importantly, we directly overturn the commonly-held assumption that word learning is impossible in the face of infinite referential uncertainty.
II. 'QUINE'S PROBLEM': LEARNING UNDER INFINITE UNCERTAINTY
Words are used in complex environments, each part of which could be labelled by a word.
Worse, words can label events imperceivable to speaker or hearer (e.g. events which are spatially or temporally distant from the time of speaking). And this is only considering the obvious possibilities -words might have 'strange' meanings (e.g. featuring disjunctions of the meanings of 'normal' words, meaning "a spark plug or an elephant", "happiness or the number 17", etc.). This idea, commonly attributed to Quine's work on radical translation (of which more below), appeals to the notion that on any situation there will be infinitely many possible meanings that a novel word could have, and is widespread in the literature:"Even if we restrict ourselves to middle-sized objects . . . we are stuck with Quine's problem, which is that children who hear a word and know that it refers to a rabbit are still faced with an indefinite number of possible meanings for this word" [1, p. 56 ]; " Quine (1960) points out that there are an infinite number of true facts about the world that a learner might need to entertain as potential meanings of each utterance." [10, p. 45 ]; "Worse, or so philosophers tell us, learners might conjure up absurd and endlessly differing representations for those entities we adults call 'the cats.'" [8, p. 136] ; "Famously articulated by Quine (1960) , in any naming situation there are infinite interpretations for an unknown word. Thus, children face a daunting task of ambiguity resolution that they must solve thousands of times." [15, p. 831] ;
"Determining the meaning of a newly encountered word should be extremely hard, due to the (in principle, unlimited) referential uncertainty inherent in the task (Quine, 1960) ." [12, p. 480] .
Such claims about inferential referential uncertainty have played an important role in the development of the theoretical motivation for research on the heuristics children use to eliminate uncertainty during word learning: seminal papers on the Mutual Exclusivity constraint [9] , the shape bias [16] , joint attention [17] and lexical constraints in general [18] all make explicit reference to the problem of there being "infinitely many" or "limitless" meanings a word could have.
The consensus is that word learning is impossible given infinite uncertainty, and that heuristics are required to eliminate some of the candidate meanings. In this paper we explore the validity of this widely-held and entirely reasonable intuition, and in particular show that it does not hold in a wide range of well-defined circumstances. However, before doing so, we briefly consider whether Quine's Problem was actually posed by Quine.
III. QUINE ON WORD LEARNING
Quine introduces the problem not in terms of word learning, but of "radical translation", his examination of how the language of a "hitherto untouched people" can be translated [5] . Much of his discussion focusses on issues only tangentially relevant to word learning, or relevant to word learning in general but not to referential uncertainty. The key passage, referred to implicitly in much of the literature, is as follows:
"For, consider 'gavagai'. Who knows but what the objects to which this term applies are not rabbits after all, but mere stages, or brief temporal segments, of rabbits? In either event the stimulus situations that prompt assent to 'Gavagai' would be the same as for 'Rabbit'. Or perhaps the objects to which 'gavagai' applies are all and sundry undetached parts of rabbits; again the stimulus meaning would register no difference." [5, p. 51-52] Interestingly, Quine never explicitly states that there is an infinite number of possible meanings for each word at any episode, although this is an entirely reasonable inference from his discussion.
Rather, it seems to us that he is much more concerned with the possibility that some candidate meanings are in principle always indistinguishable from a word's true meaning because they are always applicable to the same stimuli: "Point to a rabbit and you have pointed to a stage of a rabbit, to an integral part of a rabbit, to the rabbit fusion, and to where rabbithood is manifested" [5, p. 52 ]. As noted below, this renders word learning impossible in principle, if we treat word learning as a process of eliminating spurious meanings, as theories of cross-situational learning typically do. To escape this conundrum, we must assume that some of these indistinguishable meanings (i.e. "rabbit") are just more plausible than others ("undetached rabbit parts"). Quine suggests that we can't assume this a priori, although he acknowledges that in practice we do rank candidate meanings in terms of plausibility, saying that the linguist assumes that "the native is enough like us to have a brief general term for rabbits ... [and not] for rabbit stages or parts" [5, p. 52 ]. In the remainder of this paper, we show that Quine's intuitions on plausibility ranking over candidate word meanings solves the problem of word learning in the face of infinite referential uncertainty, and we quantify how weak those rankings can be.
IV. MODELLING THE LEARNING PROBLEM
Following the approach taken by other work on cross-situational learning, we characterise the word learning process as one of eliminating uncertainty about word meaning, and we seek to identify conditions under which the meaning of a word can be uniquely determined after multiple exposures. We take an ideal observer approach [19] and consider an optimal cross-situational word learner attempting to identify the meaning of a single word; we measure time t in terms of the number of exposures to this word that the learner has received. Each time the word is uttered, the learner infers one or more possible discrete meanings for that word drawn from an infinite set of meanings according to some specified probability distribution. We make two assumptions regarding this distribution:
The word's true meaning, the target meaning, is always included as one of the inferred meanings.
Assumption 2: All other meanings (the incidental meanings) have some nonzero probability of not being inferred.
Assumption 1 is often identified as a problem in theories of cross-situational learning (see e.g.
[20]) -we argue in the discussion below that this assumption is not in fact necessary, although it simplifies our analysis. Assumption 2 corresponds to (our reading of) Quine's concern that some meanings are in principle indistinguishable from the word's true meaning: were this the case, Assumption 2 would be violated. Excepting this, we place no restrictions on the meanings inferred or on the relationships between the inferences, either within or between exposures.
We assume that our idealised learner uses the full cross-situational learning strategy (see e.g.
[10] or [14] ), keeping track of the set of meanings that have been inferred in every exposure up to time t. The target meaning is always part of this set (Assumption 1); if the sequence of exposures is such that this set comprises precisely one meaning (which must be the target meaning), then the word is learnt.
Given this very simple model, under what formal conditions is word learning possible in finite time? Given the standard interpretation of Quine discussed above, we are particularly interested in scenarios where words can be learnt in finite time despite potentially infinite referential uncertainty.
We place no restrictions on how small learning times must be: in previous work [14] we investigated learning times for large lexicons in timescales comparable to those likely to be available for real language learners, but since here we are concerned with exploring the feasibility of cross-situational learning in principle, learning in finite time is our only requirement. In this sense we are adopting the spirit of work on language identification in the limit [21] , and applying it to word learning.
V. FORMAL CONDITIONS FOR WORD LEARNING IN FINITE TIME

A. A simple formulation of cross-situational learning
We define the learning time t * ( ) needed for the meaning of a word to be uniquely identified with probability 1 − , where is some small constant. A probabilistic notion of learning time is necessary, as it is always possible to construct an arbitrarily long sequence of exposures where the target word remains unlearnt (e.g. a sequence where both target meaning and one particular incidental meaning are always inferred). The learning time is finite when the probability of such vexatious sequences is sufficiently small that t * ( ) < ∞ for any arbitrarily small, but nonzero, .
We can interpret as the fraction of learners who have not learnt the target word's meaning at time t = t * ( ).
As outlined above, we assume that meanings are discrete, and that there are infinitely many possible incidental meanings (i.e. there are infinitely many meanings which could, in principle, be inferred on any occurrence of the target word). We therefore have a one-to-one mapping between positive integers m and incidental meanings. We define K(t) as the set of incidental meanings inferred in every episode up to time t; the word is learnt when K(t * ) = ∅. The crucial quantity in determining whether the learning time is finite is the residual plausibility of an incidental meaning m, defined as
where F m is the set of meanings {1, 2, . . . , m}. In words: the residual plausibility of incidental meaning m at time t is the probability that it is still a candidate meaning for the word given that the first m − 1 incidental meanings have all been excluded after t exposures. This definition can be applied for any ordering of the meanings; however it is often convenient to assume that they are arranged in decreasing order of their probability of being inferred in any given episode.
Given this definition, we can now state our main results, a formal derivation of which is given in the Appendix. First, the probability L(t) that the word is learnt by time t is simply the probability that all incidental meanings have been eliminated, i.e. K = ∅. We find that this can be written in terms of the residual plausibilities as
and then that the learning time t( ) is finite if and only if
Informally, we can interpret this result as follows: if the combined residual plausibility of all incidental meanings vanishes in the limit of an infinite sequence of exposures, a word's meaning can be identified with arbitrarily high probability in a finite time. We previously considered cases with a finite set of incidental meanings [14] : the learning time in such cases will be finite as long as there is some probability that each incidental meaning is excluded at any given exposure, which follows directly from our Assumption 2. Word learning is therefore always possible under our assumptions when the set of incidental meanings is finite. The case of an infinite set of incidental meanings is best elucidated through explicit examples.
B. Learning times given infinite meaning spaces
We start by assuming that each incidental meaning m is inferred with a constant probability a m in each exposure, and these inferences are statistically independent (i.e. the probability that meanings m and m are both inferred in any given exposure is just a m a m , and is the same in each episode). Under such circumstances, the probability that meaning m is inferred in all of the first t episodes is a t m , and this is independent of whether or not any other meanings (e.g. meanings 1, 2, . . . , m−1) have been inferred in each of those t exposures. In this case, the residual plausibility of meaning m at time t is p m (t) = a t m . Since by our Assumption 2 all a m < 1, i.e. all incidental meanings have some non-zero probability of not being inferred on any given exposure, it follows that p m (t) → 0 as t → ∞: every incidental meaning becomes ever more implausible as time goes on. However, unlike in the case of finite sets of incidental meanings, this does not in itself guarantee a finite learning time.
Let us arrange the meanings in decreasing order of their inference probability, i.e., such that a m+1 ≤ a m . Suppose that, for all incidental meanings, their probability of being inferred on any given exposure follows a power law: a m = cm −γ , where c and γ are positive constants. c denotes the probability of inferring the most frequent incidental meaning on any given episode, and must be less than 1 by our Assumption 2. γ denotes the rate of decay of the power-law distribution: for high γ, a m decreases rapidly with m (i.e. only the few most frequent meanings have any substantial probability of being inferred on any given trial); as γ is reduced, the distribution of a m flattens out, such that even lower-ranked meanings have a substantial probability of being inferred in any episode. Under these conditions, the sum in (3) converges (i.e. approaches some constant) for any t > 1/γ and furthermore vanishes (i.e. converges to 0) in the limit t → ∞. Importantly, note that the rate of decay of the inference probabilities can be very slow, for example, if γ is very close to zero. Indeed, when γ ≤ 1, the mean number of meanings inferred in each episode is infinite: the infinitely-long tail of meanings, each with a substantial probability of being inferred at each instance of use of the target word, leads to a situation where the learner is confronted with infinite referential uncertainty; nevertheless, the power-law decay of a m is still sufficiently fast for a cross-situational learner to be able to eliminate all non-target meanings in finite time. This refutes the common intuition, discussed above, that cross-situational learning cannot work in principle in the face of infinite referential uncertainty.
This can be illustrated using simulations of cross-situational learning. Since it is impossible to use an infinite meaning space in a simulation, we instead vary the number of available meanings, only the most frequent of these many incidental meanings is relevant to learning time: by the time the most problematic incidental meaning has been eliminated, the other less frequent incidental meanings will also have been eliminated. This influence of the most frequent confounder on learning times is a feature of all the cases we consider in this paper. In fact, in the regime < 0.01, we find good agreement between our simulation results and a very crude approximation to (2) considering only the most frequent confounder, inferred on every episode with probability c:
Setting this equal to 1 − we obtain an estimate for the learning time t * ( ). Here, we find that that, as → 0, t * ∼ ln( )/ ln(c). As can be seen from Fig. 1 , the agreement with the numerical data for < 0.01 is excellent.
It is not, however, the case that any distribution over inference probabilities a m leads to finite learning times for infinite meaning spaces. For example, as shown in the Appendix, when the inference frequencies decay logarithmically, the word is not necessarily learnt in finite time. In this case, whether learning times remain small or diverge towards infinity depends on the size of the set of incidental meanings: for logarithmic decay, learning times are determined by the most frequent confounder, as above, when this set is less than 10 18 , a vast set of possible incidental meanings.
Only above this size may learning times that diverge as M is increased become apparent. This example shows that although a cross-situational learner formally fails to learn the meaning of a word in a finite time when the inference probabilities decay logarithmically, learning is nevertheless possible unless the number of inferences that may be drawn is extremely large.
C. Correlated inferences within episodes
It is instructive to consider cases where the inference of certain meanings enhances (or diminishes) the probability that certain other meanings are inferred: such correlations between meanings can be used to capture hierarchical-or similarity-based structure within the meaning space, and as such, cross-situational learning in the presence of such correlations is an important topic of study. An extreme (but illustrative) case is where the inference of incidental meaning m on any given episode implies that all meanings more likely to be inferred are also inferred. If we order the meanings according to decreasing probability of being inferred, this means that whenever meaning m is inferred, all meanings m < m are also inferred, and if meaning m is not inferred, all meanings m > m are also not inferred.
Under this scenario, the residual plausibility of all meanings m > 1 (i.e. other than the most probable incidental meaning) is zero, because if all meanings m < m have been excluded, meaning m must also have been excluded. Hence, the probability the word is learnt after time t is equal to the probability the most probable incidental meaning has been excluded. All a finite learning time requires is this probability to approach unity as t → ∞. Within-episode correlations therefore lead to faster learning than when meanings within a single episode are statistically independent.
More generally, any incidental meaning m whose inference implies the inference of a (necessarily more plausible) meaning has residual plausibility p m (t) = 0, and can be ignored for the purposes of computing learning times. All such shadowed meanings are therefore invisible to a cross-situational learner. Quine's problem meanings seem excellent candidates for such shadowed meanings: if "undetached rabbit parts" is inferred, then "rabbit" would necessarily also be inferred and would be more plausible.
What about weaker within-episode correlations, which do not produce shadowed meanings?
Learning times here should be somewhat similar to the case where each incidental meaning is statistically independent, since weakening of within-episode correlations gradually approaches this appear, the degree of correlation being determined by α. We find that any differences from the uncorrelated case ( Fig. 1) are confined to the large-regime.
statistically independent case. While we do not have a general formation for these weak-correlation scenarios, we can investigate numerically. We use a simple Markov chain model, in which meaning 1 is inferred with probability c, and then meaning m > 1 is inferred with probability p m if meaning m − 1 is inferred, or with probability q m if meaning m − 1 is not inferred. Specifically, we choose
The parameter α controls the strength of the correlations. If α = 1, p m = q m , which means that each meaning is inferred independently of any other meaning, recovering the power law model studied earlier. On the other hand, as α → 0, the probability p m → 1 as m → ∞, which means that long strings of infrequent meanings appear together in this limit.
As anticipated, the learning time t * ( ) is largely unaffected by such correlations, even for small values of α, as shown in Fig. 2 . Specifically, the approximation that captured the behaviour of the statistically-independent case, t * ( ) ∼ ln( )/ ln(c) as ln( ) → 0, works well here too: even when within-episode correlations are present, the slowest learners are those retaining the most frequent confounding meaning as an alternative hypothesis for an extended time.
VI. DISCUSSION
We make two central assumptions in our model: that the target meaning is always inferred (Assumption 1), and that all incidental meanings have some non-zero probability of not being inferred, i.e. unlike the target meaning, they are not always inferred (Assumption 2). The latter assumption relates to Quine's observation that incidental meanings which are in principle indistinguishable from the target meaning will block learning. Although the first assumption massively simplifies the formal analysis of cross-situational learning, we don't believe it necessary for crosssituational learning to be possible. Assume instead that the target meaning is the most likely to be inferred whenever the word is uttered: given enough exposures, this meaning will have been inferred more times than any arbitrarily high-probability incidental meaning, and a learner who identifies the meaning which is most strongly associated with the target word will learn the word (as discussed in, e.g., [12] ). Therefore, cross-situational word learning should be possible as long as learners employ heuristics that reliably lead to the target word being the most plausible (over many episodes, not necessarily in any given episode).
Given that words are used in dialogues with recurring themes and linguistic constructions [22] , we might also expect temporally correlated inferences: a meaning being inferred in one episode may affect its probability of being inferred in the next episode. With such correlations, one can associate a timescale τ after which the correlation has decayed. In this case, we would simply expect all learning timescales to increase by a factor of order τ ; this does not affect whether the learning time is infinite or not, unless τ itself is infinite.
We have focussed here on learning a single word, but the same techniques can be extended to learning large lexicons, using the methods presented in our previous work [14, 23] . In particular, the case where words are not learnt independently, but that learning one word can facilitate learning another (e.g. through Mutual Exclusivity) is considered in [23] .
Our idealised learner employs the most powerful form of cross-situational learning possible, tracking those meanings which consistently co-occur with the target. Weaker forms of crosssituational learning are possible, and seem to better characterise human cross-situational learning in some scenarios [12, 13] : for instance, learners might track frequency of meanings rather than the confounding set, or they might simply retain a single preferred candidate meaning across exposures, retaining or rejecting this hypothesis in the light of each exposure. We have previously shown, for finite sets of incidental meanings, that these weaker strategies tend to increase the time required to learn a lexicon, without introducing any qualitative shift in the conditions under which cross-situational learning is possible [14] . While exploring these mechanisms for the case of infinite meaning spaces is an area for future work, we expect that the picture presented here will in general hold: details of the exact cross-situational strategy applied are unlikely to influence whether learning time is finite or not.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have established a very general formal foundation for the study of cross-situational learning, obtaining an exact expression for the probability, L(t) that a word is learnt after t exposures by an ideal cross-situational learner, valid for an arbitrary distribution of incidental meanings. We have also established criteria for when this is learning time is finite, i.e. cross-situational learning is possible, based on the residual plausibility of an incidental meaning. When confounding meanings are inferred independently, the learning time is well estimated by the asymptotic formula t * = ln / ln c,
where c is the frequency of the most common incidental meaning. This approximation also works well when there are within-episode correlations between inferred meanings. Importantly for the debate in the cognitive sciences over word learning in the face of infinite uncertainty, we have identified at least one scenario in which referential uncertainty at every exposure is infinite, yet learning times are still finite. This finding suggests that the common intuition, that cross-situational learning is impossible in such circumstances, is incorrect. Furthermore, we show that cross-situational learning is possible even if the learner's heuristics only impose very weak constraints on the plausibility ranking of possible meanings. This work therefore suggests that word learning heuristics can in principle be far weaker than previously suggested and still allow word learning.
Appendix A: Derivation of the main result
Here we show that Equations (1) and (3) and the statement that a word can be learnt in a finite time are equivalent. We recall that K(t) is the set of confounding meanings that have appeared in every episode until time t and that F M comprises the first M meanings. We introduce
the probability that the first M meanings have all failed to appear at least once in the first t episodes. From the definition of conditional probability,
where p M (t) is given by Eq. (1) . This is valid for all M > 0 if we take L 0 (t) = 1 for all t. Hence,
The probability that the target meaning has been disambiguated from all other meanings is
Since p m (t) is a probability, and lies between zero and one, this infinite product exists (and furthermore itself lies between zero and one).
We are interested in the case where L * = lim t→∞ L(t) = 1, since this corresponds to the word having a finite learning time. This fact follows straightforwardly from the definition of a limit, which is that for any sufficiently small, there exists a t * such that L(t) > 1 − for all t > t * . The smallest t * for which this is true for any given corresponds to the learning time t * ( ) defined in the main text.
To show that (3) is a necessary and sufficient condition for a finite learning time, our strategy is as follows. We shall first assume that (3) is true, and will then find that this implies L * = 1, and the learning time is finite. We then then consider the case where (3) does not hold, and find that L * < 1 as a consequence, and hence that the learning time is infinite.
In the first instance, where (3) is assumed, it follows that, for sufficiently large t, we have max m {p m (t)} arbitrarily small, and in particular less than unity. We can then take the logarithm of (A4) and expand as a power series to obtain the convergent double series
Since all terms in this double series have the same sign, the order of the summation indices can be exchanged, and the resulting double series
has the same limit: L(t) = J(t) [24] . (By contrast, if either of these double series diverges, then so does the other).
Using the fact that
where the second equality follows because it is assumed at the outset that ∞ m=1 p m (t) converges to a value smaller than unity. Exponentiating both sides, we finally obtain the inequality
Since the condition (3) states that the series on the right-hand side of the previous expression vanishes as t → ∞, we have that L * ≥ 1. However, L * cannot exceed unity: hence L * = 1 and the condition (3) is sufficient for a finite learning time.
We now show that (3) is also a necessary condition, i.e., that if (3) does not hold, the learning time is infinite. We consider again (A6), and find that ln
Now, if (3) does not hold, we must have the strict inequality lim t→∞ ln J(t) < 0 .
If the sum for ln J(t) converges for sufficiently large t, we have that L(t) = J(t), and hence L * < 1 when (3) does not hold. Hence, the learning time becomes infinite at some nonzero in this case.
On the other hand, if the sum for ln J(t) diverges at all finite times, so does the sum for ln L(t), which implies that L * = 0, which again indicates an infinite learning time.
Appendix B: The case of logarithmic decay
In the text we discuss the situation where inference frequencies decay logarithmically, e.g., a m = c ln 2/ ln(m + 1), and mention that under this scenario the word is not necessarily learnt in finite time. By applying the integral test, one finds that the sum in (3) diverges at any time t < ∞, which in turn implies that the learning time diverges for any < 1.
The way in which the learning time diverges in this example turns out to be quite subtle and somewhat revealing. Suppose we keep only the first M confounding meanings. Then, from (2) The integrand e u /u t has a minimum at u = t. This provides an estimate of the value of u at which we can no longer regard e u as constant, and at which the integral begins to diverge. The estimate of t * obtained above is therefore only valid if u < t * across the whole range of the integral, and in particular at the top end u ≈ ln(M ). For this model we therefore find that the learning time will be apparently finite if M < ( ) 1/ ln(c) . For the case = 0.01 and c = 0.9, we would need to consider at least 10 18 confounding meanings before probing the region where the integral diverges.
